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Abstract—We study the secrecy capacity of a helper-assisted
Gaussian wiretap channel with a source, a legitimate receiver,
an eavesdropper and an external helper, where each terminal
is equipped with multiple antennas. Determining the secrecy
capacity in this scenario generally requires solving a nonconvex
secrecy rate maximization (SRM) problem. To deal with this
issue, we first reformulate the original SRM problem into a
sequence of convex subproblems. For the special case of single-
antenna legitimate receiver, we obtain the secrecy capacity via a
combination of convex optimization and one-dimensional search,
while for the general case of multi-antenna legitimate receiver, we
propose an iterative solution. To gain more insight into how the
secrecy capacity of a helper-assisted Gaussian wiretap channel
behaves, we examine the achievable secure degrees of freedom
(s.d.o.f.) and obtain the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. in closed-
form. We also derive a closed-form solution to the original SRM
problem which achieves the maximal s.d.o.f.. Numerical results
are presented to illustrate the efficacy of the proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The area of physical (PHY) layer security has been pio-
neered by Wyner [1], who introduced the wiretap channel and
quantified security with the maximal achievable secrecy rate
(also known as the secrecy capacity) at which the legitimate
receiver can correctly decode the source message, while the
eavesdropper can retrieve almost no information. Results in
[2] further show that for the classical source-destination-
eavesdropper Gaussian wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity
is zero when the quality of the legitimate channel is worse
than that of the eavesdropper’s channel. One way to achieve
non-zero secrecy rate in the latter case is to introduce external
helpers which act as cooperative jammers [3]. By transmitting
jamming signals the external helpers degrade the eavesdrop-
per’s channel without hurting the legitimate channel, thus
allowing secret communication even when the eavesdropper’s
channel has a much better quality. Works along these lines
include [4]–[7] which consider one external helper and [8]–
[14] which consider the case of multiple external helpers. More
complex relaying scenarios are considered in [15]–[18] where
the jamming signal is sent in the relaying phase, or in both
the broadcasting phase and the relaying phase.
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Although cooperative jamming approaches improve the se-
crecy rate, their advantage comes from optimally designed
input covariance matrices, which are difficult to obtain due
to the nonlinear fractional nature of the problem. To ad-
dress this issue, for the single-antenna eavesdropper case,
[10]–[12] propose a suboptimal but cost efficient null-space
jamming scheme that spreads the jamming signal within the
null-space of the legitimate receiver’s channel, while [6]–
[9], [18] design algorithms to get the optimal solution using
a combination of convex optimization and one-dimensional
search. For the multi-antenna eavesdropper case, [13], [14]
design the jamming signals so that they align into a pre-
specified jamming subspace at the legitimate receiver, while
spanning the whole received signal space at the eavesdropper.
This approach allows the legitimate receiver to completely
remove the interference by projecting the received signal to
the secrecy subspace, while confounding the eavesdropper.
Still for the multi-antenna eavesdropper case, the work of
[4] provides a closed-form expression for the structure of the
jamming signal covariance matrix that guarantees secrecy rate
larger than the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with
no jamming signals. The results of [4] are obtained under the
power covariance constraint.
In this paper, we consider a multi-input multi-output
(MIMO) Gaussian wiretap channel with one external multi-
antenna helper as in [4]. Different from [4], we investigate the
secrecy rate maximization (SRM) problem under an average
power constraint. To the best of the authors’ knowledge,
determining the exact secrecy capacity of a helper-assisted
MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel has not been previously
addressed. We first address the problem for the special case
of single-antenna legitimate receiver. By decomposing the
original nonconvex SRM problem into a sequence of convex
subproblems, we obtain the optimal solution to the original
SRM problem via a combination of convex optimization and
one-dimensional search. For the general case of multi-antenna
legitimate receiver, we propose an iterative algorithm to solve
the original SRM problem via employing the Gauss-Seidel ap-
proach, which successively optimizes each variable while the
other variables are kept fixed. Specifically, each subproblem is
convex and admits an optimal solution. Though the proposed
iterative algorithm provides no guarantee of finding the global
optimal solution, it constitutes an efficient way for attaining a
meaningful achievable secrecy rate.
In order to gain more insight into how the secrecy capacity
of a helper-assisted MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel behaves,
we examine the rate at which the secrecy capacity scales with
log(P ), i.e., the maximal achievable secure degrees of freedom
2(s.d.o.f.) [19]. To this end, we first introduce an alternative
optimization problem, i.e., maximizing the dimension of the
subspace spanned by the message signal received at the
legitimate receiver, under the constraints that the message
and jamming signals lie in different subspaces at the legiti-
mate receiver, but are aligned into the same subspace at the
eavesdropper. We then give a critical lemma, proving that the
maximal achievable objective value of the newly introduced
optimization problem equals the maximal achievable s.d.o.f..
Consequently, the original s.d.o.f. maximization reduces to
the newly introduced optimization problem. Subsequently, we
solve analytically the newly introduced optimization problem,
thus obtaining the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. of the helper-
assisted MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel in closed-form.
Further, we derive an analytical solution to the original SRM
problem, which achieves the maximal s.d.o.f.. Our analytical
results prove that for the special case of single-antenna legit-
imate receiver, a s.d.o.f. of 1 can be achieved if and only if
Ne < Na +Nj − 1; for the case of multi-antenna legitimate
receiver, the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. is zero if and only if
Ne ≥ Na +Nj .
We should note that the s.d.o.f. for the helper-assisted
Gaussian wiretap channel has also been investigated in [14],
[20]–[22]. Different from our work, the work of [14] studies a
scenario in which a large number of helpers is available, and
exploits multiuser diversity via opportunistic helper selection
to enhance security. The works of [20], [21] consider a
scenario in which each terminal is equipped with one antenna,
while the work of [22] considers the special scenario in
which the source, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
are equipped with the same number of antennas. Further,
the works of [20]–[22] examine the s.d.o.f. based on real
interference alignment, while our work is based on spatial
interference alignment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the system model for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel with one external multi-antenna helper, and formulate
the secrecy rate maximization problem. In Section III, we
consider the special case of single-antenna legitimate receiver.
We investigate the secrecy rate maximization problem, and
examine the conditions under which a secure degrees of
freedom equal to 1 can be achieved. In Section IV, we consider
the general case of multi-antenna legitimate receiver, inves-
tigate the secrecy rate maximization problem, and examine
the maximal achievable secure degrees of freedom. Numerical
results are provided in Section V and conclusions are drawn
in Section VI.
Notation: AH , tr{A} and rank{A} stand for the hermitian
transpose, trace and rank of the matrix A, respectively;A(:, j)
indicates the j-th column of A while and A(:, i : j) denotes
the columns from i to j of A. span(A) and span(A)⊥ are
the subspace spanned by the columns of A and its orthogonal
complement, respectively; null(A) denotes the null space of
A; span(A)/span(B) , {x|x ∈ span(A),x /∈ span(B)}.
A  B denotes that A−B is a hermitian positive semidefinite
matrix. CN×M indicates a N ×M complex matrix set. i ∈ Z
denotes that i is a positive integer. I represents an identity
matrix with appropriate size. Besides, a+ , max(a, 0); |a|
is the magnitude of a; x ∼ CN (0,Σ) means x is a random
variable following a complex circular Gaussian distribution
with mean zero and covariance Σ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with a
cooperative jammer (see Fig.1) where the source, the legit-
imate receiver, the eavesdropper and the external helper are
equipped with Na, Nb, Ne and Nj antennas, respectively. The
source wishes to send its message, x, to the legitimate receiver,
without being eavesdropped by the eavesdropper. Towards that
objective, the source is aided by a cooperative terminal, which
simultaneously transmits jamming signal, z, to confuse the
eavesdropper. The signals received at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper can be respectively expressed as
yd = H1Vx+G2Wz+ nd (1a)
ye = G1Vx+H2Wz+ ne, (1b)
where V and W are the precoding matrices at the source and
the helper, respectively; nd ∼ CN (0, I) and ne ∼ CN (0, I)
represent noise at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
respectively; G2 ∈ CNb×Nj and H2 ∈ CNe×Nj represent
the helper to legitimate receiver and the helper to eaves-
dropper channel matrices, respectively; H1 ∈ CNb×Na and
G1 ∈ CNe×Na denote the channel matrix from the source
to the legitimate receiver and the source to the eavesdropper,
respectively. All channels are assumed to be flat fading.
We assume that global channel state information (CSI) is
available, including the CSI for the eavesdropper. This is
possible in situations in which the eavesdropper is normally an
active member of the network, communicating nonconfidential
information with the other parties in other time slots [4]. A
minimum-Mean-Square-Error (MMSE) receiver is considered
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. The rate at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can be respectively
expressed as
Rd = log|I+ (I+G2QjGH2 )−1H1QaHH1 | (2a)
Re = log|I+ (I+H2QjHH2 )−1G1QaGH1 |, (2b)
where Qa , VVH and Qj , WWH are the transmit
covariance matrices at the source and the helper, respectively.
In the paper, we focus on the SRM problem [23], i.e., 1
Cs , max
{Qa0,Qj0}
Rd −Re
s.t. tr{Qa +Qj} ≤ P , (3)
where P is a given total transmit power budget and Cs denotes
the maximal achievable secrecy rate, also known as the secrecy
capacity.
Generally, the optimization problem of (3) is nonconvex.
It is challenging and still an open problem to determine the
exact secrecy capacity. In this paper, we propose to solve the
problem of (3) by reformulating it into a sequence of convex
problems. Also, we study the rate at which the secrecy capacity
1For a given point {Qa,Qj}, the achieved secrecy rate is max(Rd −
Re, 0). For ease of exposition, the trivial case with zero achievable secrecy
rate is omitted.
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Fig. 1: MIMO wiretap channel with an external helper
scales with log(P ), i.e., the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. [19],
which equals
s.d.o.f , lim
P→∞
Cs
log P
. (4)
We compute s.d.o.f analytically and determine its connection
to system parameters, i.e., the number of antennas at each
terminal.
In the following sections, we will begin with the simple case
where the legitimate receiver is equipped with one antenna.
Then, a more complicated scenario, in which each terminal is
equipped with multiple antennas will be investigated.
III. HELPER-ASSISTED MISOME WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider the helper-assisted multi-input
single-output multi-antenna-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap
channel where the legitimate receiver is equipped with a single
antenna (Nb = 1). In such case, the legitimate receiver can
receive at most one data stream. Thus, the source transmits
one data stream x. Let v denote the precoding vector at the
source. The signals received at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper can be respectively expressed as
yd = h1vx + g2Wz+ nd (5)
ye = G1vx +H2Wz+ ne, (6)
where h1 ∈ C1×Na denotes the channel vector from the source
to the legitimate receiver, and g2 ∈ C1×Nj represents the
channel vector from the helper to the legitimate receiver. The
rate at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can be
simplified as,
Rd = log(1 + (1 + g2Qjg
H
2 )
−1h1vv
HhH1 ) (7a)
Re = log(1 + v
HGH1 (I+H2QjH
H
2 )
−1
G1v). (7b)
Correspondingly, the secrecy capacity equals
Cs = max
{v,Qj0}
Rd −Re
s.t. tr{vvH +Qj} ≤ P. (8)
Due to the presence of the multi-antenna eavesdropper,
the SRM problem becomes more complex as compared with
the problem considered in [6]–[8], [10]. To cope with this
issue, we resort to theorems on partial ordering of hermi-
tian matrix [24]. Based on these theorems, we transform
the original matrix inverse constraint into a convex linear
matrix inequality (LMI) constraint, which, together with the
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique, enables us to recast
the original nonconvex optimization problem into a sequence
of semidefinite programmes (SDPs). Further, we prove that
the optimal solutions to the relaxed optimization problem
are also optimal solutions to the original SRM problem.
Consequently, we obtain the optimal solution to the original
SRM problem with a combination of convex optimization
and one-dimensional search. On the other hand, to gain more
insight into how the secrecy capacity of the helper-assisted
MISOME Gaussian wiretap channel behaves, we examine the
conditions under which a s.d.o.f. equal to 1 can be achieved.
To this end, we first introduce an alternative optimization
problem which keeps the message signal and the jamming
signal into different subspaces at the legitimate receiver, but
aligns them into the same subspace at the eavesdropper. We
then give two key lemmas. Lemma 1 proves that, a s.d.o.f.
equal to 1 can be achieved if and only if the newly introduced
optimization problem returns a nonempty set. Lemma 2 gives
the conditions under which the newly introduced optimization
problem returns a nonempty set. Combining the two lemmas,
we finally show that a s.d.o.f. equal to 1 can be achieved if
and only if Ne < Na +Nj − 1.
A. Secrecy rate maximization
To solve the SRM problem in (8), the Two-Layer idea of [8]
is adopted. The key insight is to recast the original optimiza-
tion problem in (8) as a two-level optimization problem. The
inner-level part is dealt with the SDR technique, and the outer-
level part is handled by one-dimensional search. Specifically,
the outer-level part is
max
τ∈[τlb,τub]
log(1 + g(τ)) − log(1 + τ), (9)
where g(τ) is obtained by solving the following inner-level
part optimization problem for a fixed τ :
g(τ) = max
{v,Qj0}
h1vv
HhH1 /(1 + g2Qjg
H
2 ) (10a)
s.t. vHGH1 (I+H2QjH
H
2 )
−1
G1v ≤ τ (10b)
tr{vvH +Qj} ≤ P. (10c)
By performing one-dimensional search on τ , the optimal
τ⋆ maximizing the objective function in (9) can be found.
Correspondingly, the optimal solution {v⋆,Q⋆j} to the original
optimization problem of (8) can be obtained.
In (9), τlb and τub denote the lower and upper bound on
γe, respectively. Firstly, it is obvious that γe is no less than
0. Thus, we have τlb = 0. Secondly, according to the security
requirement, γe should be no more than γd. Further, γd is
upper bounded by the maximal received signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) value of P |h1|2 at the legitimate receiver. Therefore,
τub = P |h1|2.
So far, τlb and τub have been determined. In the following,
we focus on solving the optimization problem of (10), which
4is still nonconvex. To solve it, we resort to the SDR technique
of [25]. On denoting Qa = vvH and dropping the rank-one
constraint, the optimization problem of (10) can be rewritten
as
f(τ) = max
{Qa0,Qj0}
h1Qah
H
1 /(1 + g2Qjg
H
2 ) (11a)
s.t. G1QaG
H
1  τ(I +H2QjHH2 ) (11b)
tr{Qa +Qj} ≤ P , (11c)
where the replacement of the constraint (10b) with (11b) can
be proven using basic theorems on partial ordering [24] as
follows:
(10b) ⇔λmax((I+H2QjHH2 )
−1
G1vv
HGH1 ) ≤ τ
⇔(I+H2QjHH2 )−1G1vvHGH1  τI
⇔G1vvHGH1  τ(I +H2QjHH2 )⇔ (11b).
In the above, λmax(A) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of
A.
Letting ξ = (1 + g2QjgH2 )−1 > 0, Q˜a = ξQa, Q˜j=ξQj ,
and using the Charnes-Cooper transformation [26], we can
recast the optimization problem of (11) as
f(τ) = max
{Q˜a0,Q˜j0,ξ>0}
h1Q˜ah
H
1
s.t. ξ + g2Q˜jg
H
2 = 1
G1Q˜aG
H
1  τ(ξI +H2Q˜jHH2 )
tr{Q˜a + Q˜j} ≤ ξP , (12)
which is a SDP and can be efficiently solved using available
software packages, e.g., CVX [26].
Let us consider the power minimization problem associated
with (11), which can be formulated as follows:
min
{Qa,Qj}
tr{Qa +Qj}
s.t. h1Qah
H
1 /(1 + g2Qjg
H
2 ) ≥ f(τ)
G1QaG
H
1  τ(I+H2QjHH2 )
Qa  0,Qj  0, (13)
where f(τ) is obtained by solving the optimization problem
of (12). We have the following two propositions.
Proposition 1: Denote the optimal solution to (13) as
{Qˆa, Qˆj}. Then, Qˆa is rank-one provided that a positive
secrecy rate is achieved.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 2: Denote the optimal solution to (13) as
{Qˆa, Qˆj}. Then, {Qˆa, Qˆj} is also the optimal solution to
the problem of (11).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Let Qoa = Qˆa and Qoj = Qˆj . Combining Proposition 1 with
Proposition 2, we get that {Qoa,Qoj} is the optimal solution to
the problem of (11), such that rank{Qoa} = 1. Therefore, the
optimization problem of (11) is indeed a tight approximation
of the optimization problem of (10). Moreover, {Qoa,Qoj} is
also the optimal solution to the problem of (10) and g(τ) =
f(τ).
B. Conditions to ensure s.d.o.f. equal to 1
As stated in the preceding sections, it is difficult to obtain an
analytical expression for the secrecy capacity for the helper-
assisted Gaussian wiretap channel. Instead, in this subsection,
we investigate the conditions under which a s.d.o.f. equal to 1
can be achieved. To this end, we first introduce an alternative
optimization problem as follows:
find {v,W} (14a)
s.t. span(G1v) ⊂ span(H2W) (14b)
span(g2W) ∩ span(h1v) = {0} (14c)
|h1v| > 0. (14d)
Specifically, we aim to find the point at which the subspace
spanned by the message signal and that spanned by the
jamming signal have no intersection at the legitimate receiver,
such that Rd scales with log(P ). Simultaneously, the sub-
space spanned by the message signal belongs to the subspace
spanned by the jamming signal at the eavesdropper, such that
Re converges to a constant as P approaches to infinity.
In the sequel, we first give two key lemmas. Lemma 1
proves that s.d.o.f. equal to 1 can be achieved if and only if the
optimization problem of (14) returns a nonempty set. Lemma
2 gives the conditions under which the optimization problem
of (14) returns a nonempty set. Combining the two lemmas,
we finally obtain the conditions to ensure s.d.o.f equal to 1 in
the helper-assisted MISOME Gaussian wiretap channel.
Lemma 1: The secure degrees of freedom equal to 1 can
be achieved if and only if the optimization problem of (14)
returns a nonempty set.
Proof: Clearly, if the optimization problem of (14) returns
a nonempty set, then s.d.o.f. equal to 1 can be achieved. So
the sufficiency holds true.
We now turn to prove the necessity by contradiction. If the
optimization problem of (14) returns an empty set, then at
least one of the constraints in (14) does not hold true. We test
(14b)-(14d) one by one:
1) If (14b) does not hold true, then there exists a direction
along which the eavesdropper can extract the message
signal without interference, so the rate at which Re
scales with log(P ) is 1. Together with (4),(8) and the
fact that the rate at which Rd scales with log(P ) is at
most 1 for the multi-input single-output (MISO) source-
receiver channel, we arrive at s.d.o.f. = 0.
2) If (14c) does not hold true, then the message signal is
aligned in the subspace spanned by the jamming signal,
so Rd converges to a constant when P approaches to
infinity, which indicates that s.d.o.f. = 0.
3) If (14d) does not hold true, then |h1v| = 0, which
indicates that Rd = 0, thus s.d.o.f. = 0.
Summarizing, if the optimization problem of (14) returns an
empty set, s.d.o.f. = 0. Therefore, if s.d.o.f. = 1, the
optimization problem of (14) returns a nonempty set. This
completes the proof.
Before proceeding to Lemma 2, we first introduce the
generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) transform,
which provides the basis for the proof of Lemma 2 to follow.
5Definition 1 (GSVD Transform): Given two matrices H ∈
CN×M and G ∈ CN×K , let
k ,rank{[HH ,GH ]T } (15a)
p ,dim{span(H)⊥ ∩ span(G)} (15b)
r ,dim{span(H) ∩ span(G)⊥} (15c)
s ,dim{span(H) ∩ span(G)}, (15d)
then we have
k =min{M +K,N} (16a)
p =k −min{M,N} (16b)
r =k −min{K,N} (16c)
s =min{M,N}+min{K,N} − k. (16d)
The proof is given in Appendix C. According to [27], the
GSVD of (HH ,GH) returns unitary matrices Ψ1 ∈ CM×M
and Ψ2 ∈ CK×K , non-negative diagonal matrices D1 ∈
CM×k and D2 ∈ CK×k, and a matrix X ∈ CN×k with
rank{X} = k, such that
HΨ1 = XD
H
1 (17a)
GΨ2 = XD
H
2 , (17b)
in which D1 =


Ir 0 0
0 S1 0
0 0 0

, D2 =


0 0 0
0 S2 0
0 0 Ip

,
where the diagonal entries of S1 ∈ Rs×s and S2 ∈ Rs×s are
greater than 0, and DH1 D1 +DH2 D2 = I.
For simplicity, in the following text of this paper, we denote
the above GSVD Transform as
(Ψ1,Ψ2,D1,D2,X, k, r, s, p) = gsvd(H
H ,GH).
Lemma 2: The optimization problem of (14) returns a
nonempty set if and only if Ne < Na +Nj − 1.
Proof: We start with the constraint of (14c). With the
GSVD Transform of (hH1 ,gH2 ), we get s1 , dim{span(h1)∩
span(g2)} = 1. Thus to satisfy (14c), we should have |h1v| =
0 or |g2W| = 0. However, |h1v| = 0 contradicts (14d), so
we should have |g2W| = 0.
Without loss of generality, let W = ΓW1 where Γ =
null{g2} ∈ CNj×(Nj−1), W1 ∈ C(Nj−1)×(Nj−1). Substitut-
ing W = ΓW1 into (14b), we arrive at
span(G1v) ⊂ span(H2ΓW1), (18)
in which G1 ∈ CNe×Na and H¯2 , H2Γ ∈ CNe×(Nj−1).
Invoking the GSVD Transform of (H¯H2 ,GH1 ), we obtain
(Ψ¯1, Ψ¯2, D¯1, D¯2, X¯, k2, r2, s2, p2) = gsvd(H¯
H
2 ,G
H
1 ),
such that
H¯2Ψ¯1 = X¯D¯
H
1 (19a)
G1Ψ¯2 = X¯D¯
H
2 , (19b)
where k2 = min{Na + Nj − 1, Ne}, p2 = k2 − min{Nj −
1, Ne}, r2 = k2 − min{Na, Ne} and s2 = min{Na, Ne} +
min{Nj − 1, Ne} − k2.
To satisfy (14d), we should have v 6= 0, which, together
with (19a) and (19b), indicates that (18) holds true if and
only if p2 < Na.
1) For the case of Ne ≤ Nj − 1, p2 = Ne − Ne = 0. So
p2 < Na.
2) For the case of Nj − 1 < Ne < Na + Nj − 1, p2 =
Ne − (Nj − 1) < Na.
3) For the case of Ne ≥ Na + Nj − 1, p2 = Na + Nj −
1− (Nj − 1) = Na.
Summarizing, p2 < Na if and only if Ne < Na +Nj − 1.
Therefore, if Ne < Na + Nj − 1, (18) holds true, thus
the optimization problem of (14) returns a nonempty set.
Otherwise, if Ne ≥ Na + Nj − 1, (18) does not hold true,
so the optimization problem of (14) returns an empty set. In
a word, the optimization problem of (14) returns a nonempty
set if and only if Ne < Na+Nj−1. This completes the proof.
Throrem 1: The secure degrees of freedom equal to 1 can
be achieved if and only if Ne < Na +Nj − 1.
Proof: Combining Lemma 1 with Lemma 2, it is clear
that the secure degrees of freedom equal to 1 can be achieved
if and only if Ne < Na +Nj − 1. This completes the proof.
Remark: It is worthwhile to note that Lemma 2 also provides
us with a way to determine the precoding matrices at the
source and the helper to achieve s.d.o.f. of 1. In the remaining
text of this subsection, we first give the precoding matrices
to achieve s.d.o.f. of 1 in closed-form. We then substitute the
derived precoding matrices into (8) and solve for the optimal
power allocation between the message signal and the jamming
signal. Consequently, we obtain an analytical lower bound on
the secrecy capacity.
Revisiting the proof of Lemma 2, for the case of Ne <
Na + Nj − 1, k2 = Ne, r2 = k2 − min{Na, Ne} and s2 =
min{Na, Ne}+min{Nj−1, Ne}−k2. Actually, s2 > 0 which
can be justified as follows: (i) For the case of Ne ≤ Nj − 1,
s2 = min{Na, Ne} > 0; (ii) For the case of Nj − 1 < Ne <
Na + Nj − 1, s2 = min{Na, Ne} − (Nj − 1) − Ne > 0 ⇔
min{Na, Ne} > Ne−(Nj−1) where the latter inequality can
be easily verified.
Let I = {j|r2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ r2 + s2, j ∈ Z}. Since s2 >
0, I is a nonempty set. Let Wo1 = Ψ¯1(:, i)/|Ψ¯1(:, i)| and
vo = Ψ¯2(:, i + Na − k2)/|Ψ¯2(:, i + Na − k2)| where i ∈ I.
According to (19a) and (19b), we arrive at span(G1vo) =
span(H2ΓW
o
1) = span(X¯(:, i)), so {vo,ΓWo1} is a feasible
point to (14). Substituting v = √xvo andW =
√
P − xΓWo1
into (8), 0 ≤ x ≤ P , we arrive at
Csubs , max
{0≤x≤P}
log
1 + |h1vo|2x
1 + γsube
, (20)
in which
γsube = xv
H
o G
H
1 (I+ (P − x)H¯2Wo1Wo1HH¯H2 )
−1
G1vo
= x|G1vo|2 − x(P − x)|W
o
1
HH¯H2 G1vo|2
1 + (P − x)|H¯2Wo1|2
(21a)
= x|G1vo|2 − x(P − x)|H¯2W
o
1|2|G1vo|2
1 + (P − x)|H¯2Wo1|2
, (21b)
6where (21a) follows from the matrix inverse lemma [24],
and (21b) follows from the fact that span(G1vo) =
span(H¯2W
o
1) = span(X¯(:, i)).
For ease of exposition, let a = |h1vo|2, b = |G1vo|2 and
c = |H¯2Wo1|2. Also, noting that the logarithm function is a
monotonically increasing function, therefore the optimization
problem of (20) becomes
2C
sub
s = max
0≤x≤P
η(x), (22)
in which
η(x) ,
1 + ax
1 + bx− [bc(P − x)x/(1 + c(P − x))]
=
(1 + ax)[1 + c(P − x)]
1 + cP + (b− c)x . (23)
Resorting to carefully mathematical deductions, we solve (22)
and arrive at that when the total transmit power P is big
enough,
Csubs ≈log(aP )− 2log(1 +
√
b/c), (24)
where the details are given in Appendix D.
Substituting a = |h1vo|2, b = |G1vo|2 and c = |H¯2Wo1|2
into (24) yields
Csubs ≈log(|h1vo|2P )− 2log(1 +
√
|G1vo|2/|H¯2Wo1|2),
(25)
which in turn explicitly corroborates that s.d.o.f. equal to 1
has been achieved.
IV. HELPER-ASSISTED MIMOME WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider the helper-assisted MIMOME
wiretap channel where each terminal is equipped with multiple
antennas. In such MIMO case, the SRM problem becomes
more complex as compared with the problem considered in
Section III, and actually, it is still an open problem. To deal
with this issue, we first reformulate the SRM problem in (3) to
a form that can be processed with the Gauss-Seidel approach,
which successively optimizes each variable given that the
other variables are fixed, thus giving an iterative algorithm
to solve (3). We then examine the maximal achievable s.d.o.f.
and reveal its connection to the number of antennas at each
terminal. We obtain both the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. and
the solution that achieves the maximal s.d.o.f. in closed-form.
A. Secrecy rate maximization
In order to reformulate the SRM problem in (3) to a form
that can be processed with the Gauss-Seidel approach, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Given a positive definite matrix E ∈ CN×N , it
holds that
ln |E−1| = max
S∈N×N ,S0
ϕ(S), (26)
where ϕ(S) = −tr(SE)+ln |S|+N . Moreover, for the optimal
solution to the right-hand side of (26), it holds that S⋆ = E−1.
Proof: Please refer to [28].
Applying Lemma 3, we arrive at, respectively,
ln
∣∣(I+G2QjGH2 )−1
∣∣ = max
S00
ϕb(S0) (27a)
ln
∣∣∣(I+H2QjHH2 +G1QaGH1 )−1
∣∣∣ = max
S10
ϕe(S1), (27b)
where ϕb(S0) = −tr{S0(I+G2QjGH2 )}+ln |S0|+Nb, and
ϕe(S1) = −tr{S1(I+H2QjHH2 +G1QaGH1 )}+ln |S1|+Ne.
Substituting (27a) and (27b) into (2a) and (2b), respectively,
we arrive at
Rd = max
S00
ϕb(S0) + ln
∣∣I+H1QaHH1 +G2QjGH2
∣∣ (28a)
Re = −max
S10
ϕe(S1)− ln
∣∣I+H2QjHH2
∣∣ . (28b)
Further, substituting (28a)(28b) into (3), we arrive at
Cs = max
{Qa0,Qj0,S00,S10}
θ(S0,S1,Qa,Qj)
s.t. tr{Qa +Qj} ≤ P , (29)
where θ(S0,S1,Qa,Qj) = ϕ(S0) + ϕe(S1) + ω(Qa,Qj)
in which ω(Qa,Qj) = ln
∣∣I+H1QaHH1 +G2QjGH2
∣∣ +
ln
∣∣I+H2QjHH2
∣∣
.
Although the optimization problem of (29) is still not con-
vex, we observe that if we fix either {Qa,Qj} or Si(i = 1, 2),
the remaining problem is convex and can thus be solved
efficiently. Hence, we turn to a two-stage iterative method
(Gauss-Seidel approach), and approximately solve the opti-
mization problem of (29) via iterations between the following
two subproblems.
1) Fix {Qa,Qj}, and maximize θ(S0,S1,Qa,Qj) over
{S0,S1}.
2) Fix {S0,S1}, and maximize θ(S0,S1,Qa,Qj) over
{Qa,Qj}.
Specifically, when {Qa,Qj} is fixed, let
{S⋆0,S⋆1} = arg max
{S0,S1}
θ(S0,S1,Qa,Qj).
Applying Lemma 3, we arrive at
S⋆0 = (I+G2QjG
H
2 )
−1,
S⋆1 = (I+H2QjH
H
2 +G1QaG
H
1 )
−1
.
Besides, when {S0,S1} is fixed, the maximization of
θ(S0,S1,Qa,Qj) over {Qa,Qj} is a convex optimization
problem and can be efficiently solved by available software
packages, e.g., CVX [26].
One can easily verify that the above iterative process leads
to a monotonically non-descending objective function value
of θ(S0,S1,Qa,Qj). Moreover, for a given limited transmit
power, the achievable secrecy rate is upper bounded. Thus, the
above iterative algorithm is convergent.
Remark: Although the above iterative algorithm provides no
guarantee of finding the global optimal solution to the problem
of (29), our numerical results in the following section show
that it attains a fairly good secrecy rate performance.
7B. Maximal achievable secure degrees of freedom
In this subsection, we examine the maximal achievable
s.d.o.f. and determine its connection to the number of antennas
at each terminal. Similar to Section III, we first introduce an
alternative optimization problem as follows:
d , max
{V,W}
rank{H1V} (30a)
s.t. span(G1V) ⊂ span(H2W) (30b)
span(G2W) ∩ span(H1V) = {0}. (30c)
Specifically, we find the feasible points at which the subspace
spanned by the message signal and that spanned by the
jamming signal have no intersection at the legitimate receiver.
Simultaneously, the subspace spanned by the message signal
belongs to the subspace spanned by the jamming signal at the
eavesdropper. Among these feasible points, we determine the
one at which the rank of H1V is maximized.
Lemma 4: The maximal achievable secure degrees of free-
dom, defined in (4), equal to d. That is, s.d.o.f = d.
Proof: See Appendix E
From Lemma 4, we observe that to obtain the s.d.o.f , we
need only to focus on solving (30). To this end, in the sequel,
we first give a heuristic method which gives a closed-form
feasible point {Vˆ,Wˆ} to (30), followed by the derivation of
d⋆ , rank{H1Vˆ} in closed-form. Subsequently, in Lemma 5,
we prove that d = d⋆. Combining Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we
finally obtain s.d.o.f = d⋆. Further, we prove that {Vˆ,Wˆ}
achieves the maximal s.d.o.f., i.e., {Vˆ,Wˆ} constituting the
s.d.o.f.-optimal solution to the original SRM problem.
The aforementioned heuristic method to obtain {Vˆ,Wˆ} is
shown in Table I. Notice that in Table I, null{G1} returns an
empty matrix when Na ≤ Ne. In the following text, we prove
that {Vˆ,Wˆ} is a feasible solution for (30), and derive the
closed-form expression for d⋆. As in Table I, four cases are
discussed.
In Case I and Case II, it is clear that {Vˆ,Wˆ} is feasible
to (30) and d⋆ = rank{H1Vˆ} = min{Na, Nb}.
In Case III, for the subcase of d0 + d1 ≥ Nb, Vˆ =
[V0,V1] and Wˆ = W1. According to (31), we get
span(G2W1) = {0} and span(H2W1) = span(G1V1).
In addition, G1V0 = 0. So, span(H2Wˆ) = span(G1Vˆ)
and span(H1Vˆ)
⋂
span(G2Wˆ) = {0}, which indicate that
{Vˆ,Wˆ} is feasible to (30). Furthermore, V0 is orthogonal
with V1 by definition, thus
d⋆ =rank{[V0,V1]}
=rank{V0}+ rank{V1} = Nb.
For the subcase of d0+d1 < Nb, Vˆ = [V0,V1,V2] and Wˆ =
[W1,W2]. As in the subcase of d0 + d1 ≥ Nb, G1V0 = 0,
span(G2W1) = {0} and span(H2W1) = span(G1V1). In
addition, according to (32), span(H2W2) = span(G1V2)
and d2 = min{s4, ⌊Nb−(d0+d1)2 ⌋}. Thus span(H2Wˆ) =
span(G1Vˆ) and span(H1Vˆ)
⋂
span(G2Wˆ) = {0}. There-
fore {Vˆ,Wˆ} is feasible to (30). Furthermore, [V0,V1] is
TABLE I: A heuristic method to obtain {Vˆ,Wˆ} which is
feasible to (30)
Case I: Na ≥ Ne +Nb. Let Vˆ = null{G1} and Wˆ = 0.
Case II: Nj ≥ Nb + Ne. Let Wˆ = null{G2} ∈ CNa×(Nj−Nb) and
Vˆ be the right singular matrix of H1.
Case III: Na < Ne + Nb and Nb < Nj < Ne + Nb. For a start, let
V0 = null{G1} and d0 = (Na − Ne)+. Secondly, denote H¯2 =
H2Γ ∈ C
Ne×(Nj−Nb) where Γ = null{G2} ∈ CNa×(Nj−Nb) .
Denote G¯1 = G1Vc0 where Vc0 = null{VH0 } ∈ CNa×Ne . Invoking
the GSVD Transform of (H¯H2 , G¯H1 ) yields
(Ψ1,Ψ2,D1,D2,X, k3, r3, s3) = gsvd(H¯
H
2 , G¯
H
1 ). (31)
Subsequently, let d1 = s3, c3 = r3 +Ne − k3, and check
1) If d0 + d1 ≥ Nb, let W1 = ΓΨ1(:, r3 +1 : r3 +Nb− d0) and
V1 = Vc0Ψ2(:, c3+1 : c3+Nb−d0). Lastly, let Vˆ = [V0,V1]
and Wˆ =W1.
2) Otherwise, let W1 = ΓΨ1(:, r3 + 1 : r3 + s3) and
V1 = Vc0Ψ2(:, c3 + 1 : c3 + s3). Thirdly, denote Vc01 =
null{[V0,V1]H} ∈ CNa×(Na−d0−d1) and G˜1 = G1Vc01 .
Invoking the GSVD Transform of (HH2 , G˜H1 ) yields
(Ψ˜1, Ψ˜2, D˜1, D˜2, X˜, k4, r4, s4) = gsvd(H
H
2 , G˜
H
1 ). (32)
Then let W2 = Ψ˜1(:, r4 + 1 : r4 + d2) and V2 = Vc01Ψ˜2(:
, c4 +1 : c4 + d2) in which d2 = min{s4, ⌊Nb−(d0+d1)2 ⌋} and
c4 = r4 + (Na − d0 − d1)− k4. Lastly, let Vˆ = [V0,V1,V2]
and Wˆ = [W1,W2].
Case IV: Na < Ne+Nb and Nj ≤ Nb. For a start, let V0 = null{G1}
and d0 = (Na−Ne)+ . Secondly, denote Vc0 = null{VH0 } ∈ CNa×Ne
and G¯1 = G1Vc0. Invoking the GSVD Transform of (HH2 , G¯H1 ) yields
(Ψ1,Ψ2,D1,D2,X, k4, r4, s4) = gsvd(H
H
2 , G¯
H
1 ). (33)
Then let W2 = Ψ1(:, r4 + 1 : r4 + d2) and V2 = Vc0Ψ2(:, c4 + 1 :
c4 + d4) in which d2 = min{s4, ⌊Nb−d02 ⌋} and c4 = r4 +Na − k4.
Lastly, let Vˆ = [V0,V2] and Wˆ =W2.
orthogonal with V2 by definition, thus
d⋆ =rank{[V0,V1,V2]}
=rank{[V0,V1]}+ rank{V2}
=rank{V0}+ rank{V1}+ rank{V2}
=min{d0 + d1 + d2, Na}.
In Case IV, Vˆ = [V0,V2] and Wˆ = W2. Accord-
ing to (33), span(H2W2) = span(G1V2), which, together
with G1V0 = 0, gives span(H2Wˆ) = span(G1Vˆ). In
addition, span(H1Vˆ) ∩ span(G2Wˆ) = {0} due to d2 =
min{s4, ⌊Nb−d02 ⌋}. Thus, {Vˆ,Wˆ} is feasible to (30). Fur-
thermore, V0 is orthogonal with V2 by definition, therefore
d⋆ =rank{[V0,V2]}
=rank{V0}+ rank{V2}
=min{d0 + d2, Na}.
Summarizing the above four cases, we can rewrite d⋆ into
a more compact form as follows:
d⋆ = min{d⋆0 + d⋆1 + d⋆2, Na, Nb}, (34)
8TABLE II: Summary of the closed-form results on d⋆(s.d.o.f.)
Inequalities on the number of antennas at terminals d⋆(s.d.o.f.)
Na ≥ Ne +Nb
Nj ≥ Ne +Nb min{Na, Nb}
2Nb +Ne −Nj ≤ Na < Ne +Nb
Nb < Nj < Ne +Nb
Nb +Ne −Nj < Na < 2Nb +Ne −Nj Na +Nj − (Nb +Ne) + min{s, ⌊
2Nb+Ne−Na−Nj
2
⌋}
Nb < Nj < Ne +Nb s = min{Nb +Ne −Nj , Ne}+min{Nj , Ne} −Ne
Ne < Na < Ne +Nb, Nj ≤ Nb Na −Ne +min{s, ⌊
Nb+Ne−Na
2
⌋}, s = min{Nj , Ne}
Na ≤ Nb +Ne −Nj , Nb < Nj < Ne +Nb min{s, ⌊
Nb
2
⌋}
Na ≤ Ne, Nj ≤ Nb s = min{Na, Ne}+min{Nj , Ne} −min{Na +Nj , Ne}
in which
d⋆0 = (Na −Ne)+ (35a)
d⋆1 = (min{Na, Ne}+ (Nj −Nb)+ −Ne)+ (35b)
d⋆2 = min{s, (⌊
Nb − (d⋆0 + d⋆1)
2
⌋)+}, (35c)
where s = min{Na − (d⋆0 + d⋆1), Ne} + min{Nj, Ne} −
min{Na − (d⋆0 + d⋆1) +Nj , Ne}.
To gain more insight into d⋆, we give Table II which
clarifies the connection of d⋆ to the number of antennas at
each terminal.
Lemma 5: On d defined in (30), we have d = d⋆ where d⋆
is given in (34).
Proof: See Appendix F
Remark: According to Lemma 5, it is straight-forward that
the feasible solution {Vˆ,Wˆ} given in Table I is also the
optimal solution to (30).
Throrem 2: Consider a helper-assisted MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel, as depicted in Fig.1, where the source, the
legitimate receiver, the eavesdropper and an external helper
are equipped with Na, Nb, Ne and Nj antennas, respectively.
The maximal achievable secure degrees of freedom
s.d.o.f. = d⋆, (36)
where d⋆ is given in (34).
Proof: Combining Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, it is clear that
s.d.o.f. = d⋆. This completes the proof.
Corollary 1: The feasible point {Vˆ,Wˆ} for the optimiza-
tion problem of (30), given in Table I, serves as a s.d.o.f.-
optimal solution to the original SRM problem in (3). It
achieves the maximal s.d.o.f.. Moreover, Table II clarifies
the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. of a helper-assisted MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel, and reveals its specific connection
to the number of antennas at each terminal.
Proof: With Theorem 2, it is straight-forward to arrive at
these conclusions.
Corollary 2: When Nb > 1, the maximal achievable s.d.o.f.
of a helper-assisted MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel is zero
if and only if Ne ≥ Na + Nj . When Nb = 1, the maximal
achievable s.d.o.f. of a helper-assisted MIMO Gaussian wire-
tap channel is zero if and only if Ne ≥ Na +Nj − 1.
Proof: See Appendix G
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we give numerical results to show the secrecy
rate performance of the proposed schemes and validate our
theoretical findings. All channels are assumed to be quasi-
static flat Rayleigh fading and independent of each other,
with entries distributed as CN (0, 1). The noise vector at each
receiver is assumed to be AWGN, with i.i.d. entries distributed
as CN (0, 1). In each figure, details on the number of antennas
at each terminal will be depicted. Results are averaged over
1000 independent channel trials.
We first test the secrecy rate performance of our proposed
schemes and compare them with the existing method.
Fig.2 illustrates the secrecy rate performance of the single-
antenna legitimate receiver case. The lines labeled as “Optimal
Scheme” and “Alignment Scheme” illustrate the secrecy rate
performance of Cs and Csubs in (8) and (20), respectively.
The line labeled as “ZF Scheme” [10] gives the secrecy
rate achieved by the scheme which completely nulls out the
jamming signal at the legitimate receiver and matches the
message signal with the source-receiver (legitimate) channel.
It shows that both Cs and Csubs increase linearly with SNR.
In contrast, there exists a performance ceiling on the secrecy
rate achieved by the ZF Scheme.
Fig. 3 illustrates the secrecy rate performance of the multi-
antenna legitimate receiver case. The bar labeled as “Align-
9ment Scheme” shows the secrecy rate result of our proposed
heuristic method. In such case, closed-form precoding matrices
{Vˆ,Wˆ} are given in Table I and the total power is equally
distributed over all message signal streams and jamming
signal streams. The bar labeled as “Gauss-Seidel Approach”
shows the secrecy rate performance of our proposed iterative
algorithm in Section IV. A. As stated in Corollary 1, {Vˆ,Wˆ}
given in Table I, actually acts as a s.d.o.f.-optimal solution to
the original SRM problem in (3). So the initial point is set
as the closed-form solutions in the Alignment Scheme. For
comparison, Fig. 3 also plots the secrecy rate performance
of the method proposed in [4], wherein the secrecy rate
maximization method is derived under a power covariance
constraint. Thus, to find the maximal achievable secrecy rate
under an average power constraint, we have to solve [5,
equation (41)] [29]
Rs(P ) = max
S0,tr{S}≤P
Rs(S).
That is, numerical search over the power covariance matrix S
is performed to compute Rs(P ). Since such numerical search
is based on random choices of S, it is difficult to decide when
to stop it. To deal with this issue, we first determine the run
time of our Gauss-Seidel based algorithm of Section IV. A,
which terminates when the relative secrecy rate improvement
between two adjacent iterations is less than 10−2. We then
run the algorithm proposed in [4] for the same run time. It
is worthwhile to note that our proposed Alignment Scheme
has closed-form solutions, so it is the most computationally
inexpensive scheme. Fig. 3 shows that, with the same run
time, our proposed Gauss-Seidel based algorithm achieves
higher secrecy rate than the algorithm proposed in [4]. More
encouragingly, it can be seen that the Alignment Scheme
achieves nearly the same secrecy rate as the Gauss-Seidel
Approach based algorithm in the high SNR regime. This is
consistent with the fact that the Alignment Scheme is s.d.o.f.-
optimal, thus near-optimal at high SNR. Besides, it can be seen
that the Alignment Scheme achieves higher secrecy rate than
the algorithm proposed in [4] in the high and medium SNR
regimes. To gain more insight into the Gauss-Seidel based
algorithm, Fig. 4 plots the convergence of it. Results show
that our proposed Gauss-Seidel Approach converges very fast
and stabilizes after several loops.
We then test the achievable s.d.o.f. performance for the
helper-assisted MIMO wiretap channel and validate the theo-
retical results of Section IV. B.
In Fig. 5, the stem labeled as “Theoretical Results” shows
the theoretical maximal achievable s.d.o.f. according to Table
II. The stem labeled as “Numerical Results” shows the s.d.o.f.
achieved by the proposed Alignment Scheme. In the proposed
Alignment Scheme, closed-form precoding matrices {Vˆ,Wˆ}
are given in Table I and the total power is equally distributed
over all message signal streams and jamming signal streams.
The total power P is set as 50dB. For each channel trial, we
substitute the closed-from solution into (3) and compute the
secrecy rate Cos . We then compute the s.d.o.f. as the rate at
which the secrecy rate Cos scales with log P , i.e., Cos /log P .
It can be seen that the theoretical results almost coincide with
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the numerical results.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 plot the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. for
the helper-assisted MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under
various antenna configurations, according to Table II. Results
show that for the case of single-antenna legitimate receiver,
the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. is zero if and only if Ne ≥
Na + Nj − 1, while for the case of multi-antenna legitimate
receiver, the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. is zero if and only if
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Ne ≥ Na + Nj . Further, it is illustrated that the maximal
achievable s.d.o.f. benefits from the increasing number of
antennas at any of the three terminals, i.e., the source, the
legitimate receiver and the external helper. These results are
consistent with the theoretical findings of Section IV. B.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaus-
sian wiretap channel, where a multi-antenna external helper
is available. For the special case of single-antenna legiti-
mate receiver, we have obtained the secrecy capacity using
a combination of convex optimization and one-dimensional
search. For the case of multi-antenna legitimate receiver, we
have reformulated the original nonconvex SRM problem into
several convex subproblems. By doing so, we have been able
to provide an iterative algorithm, which attains a fairly good
secrecy rate performance. In addition, we have addressed
the s.d.o.f. maximization analytically. Specifically, we have
obtained an analytical s.d.o.f.-optimal solution to the original
SRM problem, based on which, we have obtained the maximal
achievable s.d.o.f. in closed-form. These results uncovered the
connection between the maximal achievable s.d.o.f. and the
system parameters, thus shedding light on how the secrecy
capacity of a helper-assisted MIMO Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel behaves. Numerical results have validated the theoretical
findings and confirmed the efficacy of our proposed schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The associated Lagrangian of (13) is
L =tr{Qa +Qj}+ µ[f(τ)(1 + g2QjgH2 )− h1QahH1 ]
+ tr{Z1[G1QaGH1 − τ(I +H2QjHH2 )]}
− tr{ZaQa} − tr{ZjQj}, (37)
where Z1, Za, Zj and µ are dual variables associated with the
inequalities in (13). The optimization problem of (13) is con-
vex with part of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
as follows:
Za = I− µhH1 h1 +GH1 Z1G1 (38a)
ZaQa = 0 (38b)
Z1  0,Za  0, µ ≥ 0. (38c)
Substituting (38a) into (38b), we arrive at
(I+GH1 Z1G1)Qa = µh
H
1 h1Qa. (39)
Since I + GH1 Z1G1 ≻ 0, so rank{Qa} = rank{(I +
GH1 Z1G1)Qa} = rank{µhH1 h1Qa} ≤ 1. In addition,
rank{Qa} = 0 implies that Qa = 0, which contradicts the
positive secrecy rate requirement. Thus, rank{Qa} = 1. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
For notational simplicity, let
Φ(Qa,Qj) = h1Qah
H
1 /(1 + g2Qjg
H
2 ).
Denote the optimal solution to (11) as {Q¯a, Q¯j}. Apparently,
the point {Q¯a, Q¯j} is also feasible to (13). Thus we have
tr{Qˆa + Qˆj} ≤ tr{Q¯a + Q¯j} ≤ P ,
which indicates the point {Qˆa, Qˆj} is feasible to (11). Ac-
cording to the definition of f(τ), we see Φ(Qˆa, Qˆj) ≤ f(τ).
Moreover, from (13), Φ(Qˆa, Qˆj) ≥ f(τ). Thus,
Φ(Qˆa, Qˆj) = f(τ),
which implies that the point {Qˆa, Qˆj} is also the optimal
solution to (11). This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE EQUALITIES IN (16)
Apparently, by the definition of (15a), (16a) holds true.
According to [24], for any given matrix of A, it holds that
span(AH) = null(A)⊥. (40)
Applying (40) to (15b), we get
span(H)⊥ ∩ span(G) = null(HH) ∩ null(GH)⊥
= null(HH)/[null(HH) ∩ null(GH)]
= null(HH)/null([HH ,GH ]T ). (41)
In addition, null([HH ,GH ]T ) ⊂ null(HH) by definition, so
we have p = dim{null(HH)} − dim{null([HH ,GH ]T )} =
N −min{M,N} − (N − k) = k −min{M,N}.
Similarly, we can prove (16b)-(16d). This completes the
proof.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THE LOWER BOUND ON Cs IN (24)
The optimization problem of (22) can be solved by resorting
to carefully mathematical deductions. Let y = 1+cP+(b−c)x,
α = min{b, c} and β = max(b, c). Then, y ∈ [1+αP, 1+βP ].
Substituting x = (y− (1+ cP ))/(b− c) into (23) and making
some mathematical transformations yield
η(y) = κ− (Ay +B/y) , (42)
in which κ = a(1 + cP ) + c− b
c− b +
[2a(1 + cP ) + c− b]b
(c− b)2 ,
A =
ac
(c− b)2 and B =
b(1 + cP )[a(1 + cP ) + c− b]
(c− b)2 .
Resorting to (42), the optimization problem of (22) can be
transformed into a new optimization problem that searches for
y as follows:
ηmax , max
1+αP≤y≤1+βP
κ− (Ay +B/y) . (43)
1) For the case of a(1 + cP ) > b − c, B > 0. Thus,
η(y) is increasing in y when y < y0, and decreas-
ing in y when y > y0. Herein, y0 =
√
B/A =√
b(1 + cP )[a(1 + cP )− b+ c]/(ac). Therefore, if 1+
αP ≤ y0 ≤ 1 + βP , ηmax = κ − 2
√
AB. Otherwise,
η(y) achieves its maximal value at the two endpoints
(y = 1 + αP or y = 1 + βP ), and ηmax = max{(1 +
aP )/(1 + bP ), 1}.
2) For the case of a(1 + cP ) ≤ b − c, B ≤ 0. Thus, η(y)
decreases monotonically with respect to y. It achieves
its maximal value at the two endpoints, and ηmax =
max{(1 + aP )/(1 + bP ), 1}.
Summarizing, if 1 + αP ≤ y0 ≤ 1 + βP , then ηmax =
κ− 2√AB and
Csubs =log(
c(1 + aP )[c+ b− 2√bc√1 + (c− b)/(a+ acP )]
(c− b)2
+
c(a− b) + 2(c− a)√bc√1 + (c− b)/(a+ acP )
(c− b)2 ),
(44)
where the optimal solution
x⋆ = (y0 − (1 + cP ))/(b− c)
=
√
b(1 + cP )[a(1 + cP )− b+ c]/(ac)− (1 + cP )
b− c . (45)
Otherwise, when a > b, ηmax = (1 + aP )/(1 + bP ) and
Csubs = log(1 + aP )/(1 + bP ), where the optimal solution
x⋆ = P ; when a ≤ b, ηmax = 1 and Csubs = 0, where the
optimal solution x⋆ = 0. In the sequel, we refer to these two
solutions x⋆ = 0 and x⋆ = P as the trivial solutions.
Consider the nontrivial solution of (45). When the total
transmit power P is big enough,
Csubs ≈log(aP )− 2log(1 +
√
b/c). (46)
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Before proceeding, we first give two critical properties on
matrix that will be used in the following analyses. That is, for
any given matrices A and B, if B is invertible, then
span(A) = span(AB) (47)
rank{A} = rank{AB}. (48)
Firstly, span(A) = span(ABB−1) ⊂ span(AB). Secondly,
span(A) ⊃ span(AB). Therefore, the equality (47) holds
true. With (47), it is clear that the equality (48) holds true.
Given an arbitrary point of {V,W}, with the definition in
(4), we can re-express the achieved s.d.o.f. as follows:
h(V,W) = rank{H1V} −m(V,W)− n(V,W), (49)
in which m(V,W) = dim{span(G1V)/span(H2W)} and
n(V,W) = dim{span(G2W) ∩ span(H1V)}.
Assume that {V¯,W¯} is the optimal solution to (30), then
we have span(G1V¯) ⊂ span(H2W¯) and span(G2W¯) ∩
span(H1V¯) = {0}. The achieved s.d.o.f. h(V¯,W¯) =
rank{H1V¯} = d. In addition, s.d.o.f. ≥ h(V¯,W¯) by
definition. Thus, s.d.o.f. ≥ d. As such, to complete the proof
of Lemma 4, we only need to prove s.d.o.f. ≤ d. In the sequel,
we show that, for any given point of {V,W}, we can always
find another feasible point for the problem of (30), {V′,W′},
such that h(V,W) ≤ rank{H1V′} ≤ d, thus giving the proof
of s.d.o.f. ≤ d.
Without lose of generality, denote V ∈ CNa×Ka and W ∈
CNj×Kj . With the GSVD Transform of (WHGH2 ,VHHH1 ),
we obtain unitary matrices Ψˆ1 ∈ CKj×Kj and Ψˆ2 ∈ CKa×Ka ,
non-negative diagonal matrices Dˆ1 ∈ CKj×k5 and Dˆ2 ∈
CKa×k5 , and a matrix Xˆ ∈ CNr×k5 with rank{Xˆ} = k5,
such that
G2WΨˆ1 = XˆDˆ
H
1 (50a)
H1VΨˆ2 = XˆDˆ
H
2 , (50b)
where k5 = min{Ka+Kj, Nr}, r5 = k5−min{Ka, Nr} and
s5 = min{Ka, Nr}+min{Kj, Nr} − k5.
Let
Ψˆ11 = Ψˆ1(:, r5 + 1 : r5 + s5) (51a)
Ψˆ01 = [Ψˆ1(:, 1 : r5), Ψˆ1(:, r5 + s5 : Kj)] (51b)
Ψˆ12 = Ψˆ2(:, cin + 1 : cin + s5) (51c)
Ψˆ02 = [Ψˆ2(:, 1 : cin), Ψˆ2(:, cin + s5 + 1 : Ka)], (51d)
in which cin = r5+Ka− k5. Since Ψˆ1 and Ψˆ2 are invertible
matrices, Ψˆ′1 = [Ψˆ01, Ψˆ11] and Ψˆ′2 = [Ψˆ02, Ψˆ12] are also
invertible matrices. Applying (47) and (48), we have
h(V,W) = h(VΨˆ′2,WΨˆ
′
1) (52a)
= rank{H1VΨˆ02} −m(VΨˆ′2,WΨˆ′1) (52b)
≤ rank{H1VΨˆ02} −m(VΨˆ02,WΨˆ′1), (52c)
in which (52b) can be justified with span(G2WΨˆ′1) ∩
span(H1VΨˆ
′
2) = span(H1VΨˆ
1
2). Besides, (52c) comes from
the fact that m(VΨˆ′2,WΨˆ′1) ≥ m(VΨˆ02,WΨˆ′1).
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With the GSVD Transform of ((H2WΨˆ′1)H , (G1VΨˆ02)H),
we obtain unitary matrices Ψ˘1 ∈ CKj×Kj and Ψ˘2 ∈
C(Ka−s5)×(Ka−s5), non-negative diagonal matrices D˘1 ∈
CKj×k6 and D˘2 ∈ C(Ka−s5)×k6 , and a matrix X˘ ∈ CNe×k6
with rank{X˘} = k6, such that
H2WΨˆ
′
1Ψ˘1 = X˘D˘
H
1 (53a)
G1VΨˆ
0
2Ψ˘2 = X˘D˘
H
2 , (53b)
where k6 = min{Ka − s5 +Kj , Ne}, r6 = k6 −min{Ka −
s5, Ne} and s6 = min{Kj, Ne}+min{Ka − s5, Ne} − k6.
Let
Ψ˘11 = Ψ˘1(:, 1 : r6 + s6) (54a)
Ψ˘01 = Ψ˘1(:, r6 + s6 : Kj) (54b)
Ψ˘12 = Ψ˘2(:, 1 : c˘in + s6) (54c)
Ψ˘02 = Ψ˘2(:, c˘in + s6 + 1 : Ka − s5), (54d)
in which c˘in = r6 + (Ka − s5) − k6. Since Ψ˘1 and Ψ˘2 are
invertible matrices, so Ψ˘′1 = [Ψ˘01, Ψ˘11] and Ψ˘′2 = [Ψ˘02, Ψ˘12]
are also invertible matrices. Applying (47) and (48), we have
rank{H1VΨˆ02} −m(VΨˆ02,WΨˆ′1)
= rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2} −m(VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2,WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1) (55a)
= rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2} − rank{Ψ˘02} (55b)
≤ rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘12}, (55c)
where due to span(G1VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2)/span(H2WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1) =
span(G1VΨˆ
0
2Ψ˘
0
2), (55b) holds true. Besides, (55c) holds
true due to rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2} ≤ rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘12} +
rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘02} and rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘02} ≤ rank{Ψ˘02}.
Combining (52) with (55), we arrive at
h(V,W) ≤ rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘12}. (56)
With (53) and (54), we arrive at m(VΨˆ02Ψ˘12,WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1) =
0, thus
span(G1VΨˆ
0
2Ψ˘
1
2) ⊂ span(H2WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1). (57)
In addition, with (50) and (51), we get n(VΨˆ02,WΨˆ′1) = 0.
So span(G2WΨˆ′1)∩ span(H1VΨˆ02) = {0}, which, together
with the facts that span(G2WΨˆ′1) = span(G2WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1) and
span(H1VΨˆ
0
2) ⊃ span(H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘12), gives
span(G2WΨˆ
′
1Ψ˘
′
1) ∩ span(H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘12) = {0}. (58)
Combining (57) with (58), we know {VΨˆ02Ψ˘12,WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1}
is a feasible point for the problem of (30). By definition,
rank{H1VΨˆ02Ψ˘12} ≤ d, which, together with (56), indicates
that h(V,W) ≤ d.
Because the above derivations hold true for any given point
of {V,W}, we conclude that s.d.o.f. ≤ d. This completes
the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Clearly, d ≥ d⋆ holds true. So if we can further prove
d ≤ d⋆, then the proof of Lemma 5 is completed. In the
following text, we give the proof of d ≤ d⋆ by contra-
diction. Assume that there exists a feasible point {V˜,W˜}
of (30), where V˜ ∈ CNa×Ka , d♯ , rank{H1V˜} and
Ka = d
♯ > d⋆. In such case, we have rank{V˜} = d♯ due
to d♯ = rank{H1V˜} ≤ rank{V˜} ≤ Ka = d♯. Besides, by
definition, d♯ ≤ min{Na, Nb} always holds true. In the sequel,
we discuss the four cases in Table I and give contradictions
one by one.
In Case I and Case II, d⋆ = min{Na, Nb}. The assumption
d♯ > d⋆ implies d♯ > min{Na, Nb}, which contradicts the
fact d♯ ≤ min{Na, Nb}.
In Case III, when d⋆ = min{Na, Nb}, the assumption d♯ >
d⋆ = Nb contradicts the fact d♯ ≤ min{Na, Nb}. As such, we
only need to focus on the case of d⋆ = d0 + d1 + d2, where
d0 = (Na−Ne)+, d1 = s3 and d2 = min{s4, ⌊Nb−(d0+d1)2 ⌋}.
1) For the case of s4 ≤ ⌊Nb−(d0+d1)2 ⌋, d⋆ = d0 + d1 + s4.
In addition, d♯ > d⋆. So d♯ > d0 + d1 + s4. Therefore
d♯ − d0 > s3 + s4, which contradicts (30b). The
explanation is as follows. According to (32), s4 =
min{Nj, Ne}+min{Na−d0−d1, Ne}−min{Nj+Na−
d0−d1, Ne}. With the GSVD Transform of (HH2 ,GH1 ),
s = dim{span(H2) ∩ span(G1)} = min{Nj , Ne} +
min{Na, Ne}−min{Nj +Na, Ne}. It is easy to verify
that s ≤ s3 + s4. In addition, to satisfy (30b) we should
have rank{G1V˜} ≤ s. Thus rank{G1V˜} ≤ s3 + s4.
Moreover, rank{V˜} − d0 ≤ min{Na, Ne} due to the
fact rank{V˜} ≤ Na, so rank{G1V˜} = rank{V˜} −
d0 = d
♯−d0. Therefore, d♯−d0 ≤ s3+s4, which gives
the contradiction.
2) For the case of s4 > ⌊Nb−(d0+d1)2 ⌋, d⋆ = d0 + d1 +
⌊Nb−(d0+d1)2 ⌋, which, together with the assumption d♯ >
d⋆, gives
d♯ > d0 + d1 + ⌊Nb − (d0 + d1)
2
⌋. (59)
If Nb−(d0+d1) is an even number, (59) is equivalent to
2d♯ > Nb+d0+d1. Otherwise, Nb−(d0+d1) is an odd
number, so (59) is equivalent to 2d♯ > Nb+d0+d1−1.
In addition, Nb + d0 + d1 owns the same parity as
Nb− d0− d1, thus Nb+ d0+ d1− 1 is an even number.
Therefore 2d♯ > Nb+d0+d1. To sum up, (59) indicates
2d♯ > Nb + d0 + d1. Thus d♯ − d0 > Nb − d♯ + d1.
Moreover, to satisfy (30c), we should have Nb − d♯ +
d1 ≥ rank{W˜}. So d♯ − d0 > rank{W˜}. However,
rank{G1V˜} = rank{V˜} − d0 due to rank{V˜} −
d0 ≤ min{Na, Ne}. Thus, rank{G1V˜} = d♯ − d0 >
rank{W˜} ≥ rank{H2W˜}, which contradicts (30b).
In Case IV, d⋆ = d0 + d2, where d0 = (Na − Ne)+ and
d2 = min{s4, ⌊Nb−d02 ⌋}. Since the analysis is similar to Case
III, so in the sequel we only give the skeleton on it.
1) For the case of s4 ≤ ⌊Nb−d02 ⌋, d⋆ = d0 + s4,
which, combined with the assumption d♯ > d⋆, gives
d♯ > d0 + s4. Thus d♯ − d0 > s4. However, with the
GSVD Transform of (HH2 ,GH1 ), s = dim{span(H2) ∩
span(G1)} = s4. To satisfy (30b), we should have
rank{G1V˜} ≤ s = s4, which, together with the fact
rank{V˜}− d0 ≤ min{Na, Ne}, indicates d♯− d0 ≤ s4.
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2) For the case of s4 > ⌊Nb−d02 ⌋, d⋆ = d0 + ⌊Nb−d02 ⌋,
which, together with the assumption d♯ > d⋆, gives
2d♯ > Nb + d0. Thus d♯ − d0 > Nb − d♯. However,
to satisfy (30c), we should have Nb − d♯ ≥ rank{W˜}.
Therefore, rank{V˜}−d0 = d♯−d0 > rank{W˜}, which,
together with the fact rank{G1V˜} = rank{V˜} − d0,
contradicts (30b).
Summarizing the above four cases, for any feasible points
for the problem of (30), denoted by {V˜,W˜} and V˜ ∈
CNa×Ka , if Ka = d♯, d♯ ≤ d⋆. On the other hand, if
Ka > d
♯
, resorting to the singular value decomposition
(SVD) of H1V˜, we can always find another feasible point
{V˜′,W˜′} for the problem of (30), such that V˜′ ∈ CNa×K′a
and K ′a = rank{V˜′} = rank{H1V˜′} = d♯. As such, the
assumption d♯ > d⋆ also contradicts the feasibility conditions
in (30). So d♯ ≤ d⋆.
In conclusion, for any feasible points for the problem of
(30), we should have d♯ ≤ d⋆. By definition, we arrive at
d ≤ d⋆. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
According to Table II, it is obvious that s.d.o.f. = 0 can
only happen in the last case, where
Na ≤ Nb +Ne −Nj , Nb < Nj ≤ Ne +Nb −Na
or Na ≤ Ne, Nj ≤ Nb. (60)
Thus, to complete the proof, we only need to focus on the
case of (60), where s.d.o.f. = min{s, ⌊Nb2 ⌋} in which s =
min{Na, Ne}+min{Nj, Ne}−min{Na+Nj, Ne}. Note that
the case Nb+Ne−Nj < Na ≤ Ne, Nb < Nj ≤ Ne+Nb−Na
never happens, so (60) is equivalent to
Na ≤ Ne, Nj ≤ Ne +Nb −Na, (61)
which implies s = Ne+min{Nj, Ne}−min{Na+Nj , Ne}.
Therefore,
1) for the case of Ne ≥ Na+Nj , s = 0 thus s.d.o.f. = 0;
2) for the case of Ne ≤ Nj , s = Na thus s.d.o.f. =
min{Na, ⌊Nb2 ⌋};
3) for the case of Nj < Ne < Na+Nj , s = Na+Nj−Ne
thus s.d.o.f. = min{Na +Nj −Ne, ⌊Nb2 ⌋}.
In conclusion, when Nb = 1, s.d.o.f. = 0 if and only if
Ne ≥ Na+Nj − 1; when Nb > 1, s.d.o.f. = 0 if and only if
Ne ≥ Na +Nj . This completes the proof.
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